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Abstract
Explaining cooperation between non-relatives is a puzzle for both evolutionary biology and the social sciences. In humans,
cooperation is often studied in a laboratory setting using economic games such as the prisoners’ dilemma. However, such
experiments are sometimes criticized for being played for low stakes and by misrepresentative student samples. Golden
balls is a televised game show that uses the prisoners’ dilemma, with a diverse range of participants, often playing for very
large stakes. We use this non-experimental dataset to investigate the factors that influence cooperation when ‘‘playing’’ for
considerably larger stakes than found in economic experiments. The game show has earlier stages that allow for an analysis
of lying and voting decisions. We found that contestants were sensitive to the stakes involved, cooperating less when the
stakes were larger in both absolute and relative terms. We also found that older contestants were more likely to cooperate,
that liars received less cooperative behavior, but only if they told a certain type of lie, and that physical contact was
associated with reduced cooperation, whereas laughter and promises were reliable signals or cues of cooperation, but were
not necessarily detected.
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Introduction
The evolution and maintenance of cooperation poses a problem
for both Darwinian selection and economic models based on a
rational actor (‘‘Homo economicus’’) that solely aims to maximize
personal income [1–4]. The problem is that cooperative behaviors
benefit other individuals, and so individuals that do not cooperate
should be able to out-compete cooperators. Hamilton’s influential
theory of inclusive fitness explains how cooperation can be
favoured between those that share genes for cooperation [3,5,6].
Yet cooperation also occurs between genetically unrelated
individuals and even between individuals from different species
[7–10].
The inherent instability of such cooperation between non-
relatives is often conceptualised with the aid of the prisoners’
dilemma or the tragedy of the commons whereby individuals do
best by not cooperating, no matter what their opponents do
[11,12]. Put in game theory terms, the ‘Defect’ strategy is
dominant, because it always leads to a higher payoff (or at least
never a worse payoff) than employing ‘Cooperate’. This results in
an inevitable outcome (hence ‘tragic’) in which all rational actors
defect, even though collectively they would all be better off if they
had all cooperated, hence the dilemma [11,12].
In humans, cooperation is often studied in a laboratory setting
using economic games, such as the prisoners’ dilemma or some
multi-player variant framed as a Public Goods game [13–17].
Such laboratory experiments are sometimes criticized for being
played for low stakes (typically around 2 or 3 hours wages) by non-
representative student samples and thus the conclusions drawn are
accused of lacking external validity and being biased towards more
pro-social outcomes [18–25].
Golden balls is a televised game show (see Figure 1 for a
summary) that uses the prisoners’ dilemma, with a diverse range of
participants, often playing for very large stakes (often equivalent to
more than a year’s average salary). Specifically, the show ends with
two contestants making a simultaneous decision to either split
(cooperate) or steal (defect) a sum of money. If they both choose to
split, they share the money equitably, but if only one contestant
chooses steal then this contestant gets to take all the money.
However if both contestants choose steal, they both receive £0. To
steal therefore fits the requirements for a weakly dominant strategy
[13,26]. This is because it is always either the best (when opponent
splits) or equal-best (when opponent steals) response to an
opponent’s decision, and is therefore the best strategy to employ
in terms of maximizing income (see Table 1) [13,26]. This version
of the game is therefore known as the ‘weak’ prisoners’ dilemma
and to defect is still the best strategy to employ in a one-shot weak
prisoners’ dilemma just as it is normally [13,26].
The show also has two earlier rounds, whereby the contestants
simultaneously vote to evict one contestant from the show per
round, thus four contestants are whittled down to the two finalists
who play the prisoners’ dilemma. Contestants make their votes
after being informed by a mixture of public and private
information on the worth of each contestant’s golden balls.
Depending on the round, each contestant has received either four
(round one) or five (round two) golden balls, with the worth of two
balls on public display, and the others only known privately. The
balls have been allocated at random from a population of balls
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e33344ranging in value from a minimum of £10 to a maximum of
£75,000. There are also some severely damaging special balls,
termed ‘‘killer balls’’, that are of no monetary value and that
reduce the final prize fund by 90% if not eliminated. Each ball has
potential implications for the final prize fund, thus the group
collectively benefits by elucidating the true value of the balls and
eliminating the worst balls from the game. They can do this by
identifying which contestant has the worst balls and voting that
contestant, along with his/her balls, off the show. The final prize
fund is derived from the golden balls that are carried through to
the final by the two surviving contestants. Before the voting takes
place, contestants declare the value of their hidden balls (their
private information). The contestants are free to lie, although they
are forced to declare the truth at the end of each round, after
voting has taken place. A rational, income maximizing, contestant
should therefore aim for the following; (1) to secure his or her own
passage to the final, (2) to maximize the final prize fund (by voting
Figure 1. A summary of the game show procedure showing the distribution of balls and players by round, along with when certain
variables were observed and recorded. The following text is a brief glossary followed by detailed description of each round. Golden balls: the
‘golden’ spheres that contain either cash values inside (‘£££’) or the word ‘killer’, in which case they are a ‘killer ball’. - £££ Cash balls: range in value
from £10 to £75,000. - Killer balls: have no positive value and are very damaging because they each reduce the current prize fund by 90% if they
end up in the final selection. Stakes: the final prize fund, derived from 5 randomly selected balls in the final round. Maximum-stakes: the
maximum possible prize-fund available at the start of the final round, calculated from the 5 most valuable balls in the final round. Round 1: The
game starts with 12 cash balls and 4 killer balls. Each contestant receives four balls at random, and must place two, at random, on the ‘Front Row’,
which is public and keeps two on the ‘Back Row’, which is private. In this hypothetical example, Contestant 4 has received two killer balls on her front
row and Contestant 1 has one killer ball, therefore one of the eight private balls must be a killer ball. The four contestants each show their public
balls, and then take turns declaring their private balls, where they are free to lie. The contestants then each vote one contestant off from the game.
The evicted contestant leaves the game, along with their four golden balls, which are ‘binned’. The best outcome for the group is to eliminate the
contestant with the ‘worst’ balls. After the votes have been counted, each contestant must show the true value of their private balls, this way any liars
are exposed. Round 2: The 12 balls remaining from Round 1 are carried through to Round 2, where they are mixed with an extra three balls, to
provide a total of 15 golden balls that are randomly distributed once more. Once again the contestants declare the value of their private balls, and
once again are free to lie, before voting eliminates another contestant and their balls. We only analysed lying behavior in this round. Final: The two
surviving contestants and their 10 balls enter the final, where they are accompanied by one additional killer ball. The contestants are clearly told what
the maximum prize fund possible is (Maximum-stakes) before selecting five of the 11 golden balls at random to determine their final prize-fund
(Stakes). Negotiation: After the prize-fund has been determined, the two contestants are given some time (typically under 1 minute) to discuss and
negotiate their decision in the simultaneous prisoners’ dilemma. PD - Split or Steal: the contestants now play a mini-game, which resembles the
prisoners’ dilemma and is referred to by the show as ‘‘Split or Steal’’ (see Table 1 for payoff details).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033344.g001
Table 1. The payoff matrix for the final decision in the game
show.
Opponent decision
Focal Player Decision SPLIT STEAL
SPLIT
(payoff/opponent payoff)
HALF/HALF ZERO/ALL
STEAL
(payoff/opponent payoff)
ALL/ZERO ZERO/ZERO
The payoffs refer to ‘ALL’ the prize-fund, ‘HALF’ the prize-fund, or ‘ZERO’, i.e. £0.
The payoffs conform to a weak prisoner’s dilemma, whereby to STEAL pays
better or at least as well as to SPLIT, regardless of what one’s opponent
chooses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033344.t001
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(3) to pair himself or herself with a cooperative contestant in the
final round. Of course these multiple goals may not be mutually
compatible. Such a structure of the earlier rounds allows us to
analyse the frequency and consequences of lying versus honest
behavior.
We use data from this television show to: (1) examine the extent
to which individuals cooperate when ‘playing’ for large stakes; and
(2) determine the correlates or cues of cooperation. Our aim is to
provide observational data from a game with high stakes, to both
complement existing experimental studies and suggest new issues
that would benefit from experimental study, analogous to the use
of observational field studies in the field of animal behavior [27].
Game theoretical predictions of how individuals will behave
depend upon what individuals are trying to maximise (their ‘utility’
function), which can depend upon income, but also factors such as
the welfare of others or an aversion to inequity [28–30]. However,
our aim is to determine the factors of their environment, including
their opponent’s phenotype, which contestants are responding to,
and not to test strong a priori predictions. We use game theory
models based on a rational Homo economicus and evolutionary
theory to guide this search, because they suggest correlates that
could be important. Our starting point is that each contestants
desires that his or her opponent splits, and thus should behave in
such a way that he or she thinks will maximize the probability of
such an outcome.
Since submitting our results to peer review we have learned of
another study, by van den Assem et. al. that uses the same data set
to address similar questions, and has now been accepted for
publication in Management Science [31]. Their dataset is slightly
larger than ours (five versus three series) because more episodes
had been filmed when they started their study and thus their
results are not expected to be exactly the same. In addition we take
a more biological viewpoint and thus only we analyse the effects of
geographical distance, laughter and physical contact between
opponents (see Methods below). We also are unique in presenting
the data from the pre-game interviews that reveals contestants’
declared preferences and strategies (see Methods below).
Methods
Data Collection
We purchased all 150 episodes (series 1, 2, and 3, first aired
March 2007–May 2008) that were available at the time in DVD
format from Endemol UK in October 2008. One episode was a
duplicate. We also excluded six episodes because they featured
contestants that had been on before. Thus our samples size is 143
episodes, featuring the decisions and behavior of 286 contestants.
Data scoring
Every episode was watched in real-time by one of us (MNB-C),
who recorded variables without knowledge of the final outcome of
the episode. The variables can be grouped, for the purposes of
presentation (the analysis is not affected by their groupings), into
three sets. These sets are: (i) Contestant demographics, which are
variables that are fixed at the start of an episode for each
contestant and their opponent; (ii) Structural variables, which
develop as the episode proceeds but are not ‘behavioral’, these
could be said to make up the environment contestants experience
(excluding the phenotypes of their opponents); and (iii) Behavioral
variables, which are the actions of the contestants and their
opponents. A summary of the variables and when they were
recorded can be seen in Figure 1.
Contestant preferences
Our dataset allowed us to score the preferences of the
contestants before they played the game and to compare these
with their final decisions, thus we could compare the frequencies of
different preferences, different choices, and consistency of
preferences. We could do this because before the game begins
the contestants are interviewed in private and asked to talk about
how they will play the game. The contestants’ responses are free-
form and therefore not every contestant specifies what decision
they will make in the final game (if they get that far) - we did not
include this variable in the full model of the main analysis because
it was not available for all contestants.
Contestant demographics (6 variables)
We recorded the age and sex of each contestant (‘‘Age’’ and
‘‘Sex’’ respectively) and for their opponent (‘‘Opponent-Age’’ and
‘‘Opponent-Sex’’ respectively). We also used the given home
location of each contestant and their opponent to calculate the
distance between the two (‘‘Distance’’). Finally, we also noted
which series their episode was from in order to control for any
changes over time as later contestants are possibly influenced by
viewing earlier series (‘‘Series’’). We did not use episode number as
is used by van den Assem et. al. [31], for each series was recorded
in full before been shown, therefore contestants from relatively
later episodes within a series were not exposed to more episodes
than contestants from relatively earlier episodes. Distance was
calculated by taking the shortest automobile route calculated on
GoogleMaps. We accept that such measurements are imperfect.
Structural variables (3 variables)
The contestants play for a prize fund at the end of the game.
This prize fund is determined by the picking of five golden balls at
random from a selection of 11 (see Figure 1). The contestants and
viewers are always and repeatedly made aware of the maximum
potential prize fund possible, which is the sum of the five most
valuable balls. To test if contestants are sensitive to both the prize
fund and the prize fund as a proportion of what they could have
won, we recorded both the prize fund contested (‘‘Stakes’’) and the
maximal potential prize fund possible (‘‘Maximum-stakes’’). Prior
to the final round of the game (see Figure 1), there are three
contestants competing for the final two places. In this stage, the
contestants each vote one contestant off, and typically two
contestants will cancel each other’s votes out by voting for each
other, thus leaving the other contestant with the deciding vote.
This dynamic is often ‘common knowledge’. We tested to see if
these ‘‘Deciders’’ as we called them, reaped any benefits from their
status in the form of increased rates of splitting by their opponent
in the final, and if their status affected their own decision making.
Behavioral variables (8 variables)
For each contestant we recorded if they, or their opponent, lied
or not (‘‘Lie’’, ‘‘Opponent-lie’’ respectively) in the round preceding
the final decision to split or steal. We also recorded if they, or their
opponent, initiated any physical contact during the final round or
negotiation stage (‘‘Touch’’, ‘‘Opponent-touch’’ respectively). We
also recorded if, during the negotiation stage, which occurs
immediately after the stakes have been determined and immedi-
ately prior to the final decision to split or steal, contestants or their
opponents made a promise to split (‘‘Promise’’, ‘‘Opponent-
Promise’’ respectively), and if they, or their opponent, initiated any
laughter (‘‘Laugh’’, ‘‘Opponent-laugh’’ respectively).
Lies came in two types, contestants could lie by denying they
had a killer-ball (and that it was a cash-ball instead), or they could
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e33344inflate the values of their cash –balls (see Figure 1). Promises were
only scored if a contestant explicitly stated that they would split.
Specifically, the following definitive phrases were coded as
promises; ‘‘I will split’’, ‘‘I am going to split’’, ‘‘I promise to split’’.
Phrases such as ‘‘I want to split’’, ‘‘we are going to split’’, ‘‘we should
split’’, and ‘‘I came here to split’’, were not coded as promises. We
accept that the term ‘Promise’ may not be the best fitting term for
such a variable, and it could have maybe been termed
‘Commitment’ or some other term, but we believe this to be a
semantic point only. Contestants that initiated laughter (during the
final negotiation stage) were those that laughed but not in direct
response to the laughter of their opponent. It was therefore
possible for none, one, or both contestants to initiate some
laughter. Touching was coded in a similar manner, as most
physical contact was initiated by one contestant and completed/
allowed by the other. Therefore, contestants that initiated physical
contact were those that made the first or only move in a particular
instance of contact. It was therefore possible for none, one, or both
contestants to initiate an instance of physical contact.
Analyses
We transformed the non-normally distributed variables ‘Age’,
‘Distance’, ‘Stakes’ and ‘Maximum-Stakes’ by taking their natural
logarithms. As our response variable was binary (to ‘split’ or
‘steal’), we fitted binary logistic Generalized Linear Models
(GLM), with errors clustered at the level of individual episodes,
and tested for the significance of model effects using Wald’s x
2
[32]. The final Minimum Adequate Model (MAM) was chosen
based on a comparison of Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
scores [33]. Statistics reported are from the final model.
Results
What is the frequency of cooperation/defection?
Fifty percent of the 286 contestants chose ‘‘split’’ and 50 percent
chose ‘‘steal’’. If the choices of contestants were correlated or
coordinated then one can predict the distribution of episodes
resulting in a split-split, split-steal, or steal-steal outcome. This is
done by using the observed frequency of split (P=0.5) and steal
(Q=12P) and by testing if the observed distribution differs
significantly, using a chi-square test, from those predicted by
p
2+2pq+q
2=1. We found that the distribution of episodes was as
one would expect by chance given the observed probability of
splitting or stealing (39 episodes of split:split, 39 of steal:steal, and
65 of split:steal, x
2
2=1.182, P=0.554), suggesting that the
responses of the contestants were neither correlated nor coordi-
nated.
Are there different ‘types’ of contestant?
Fifty-nine percent of contestants (N=148 of 252 interviewed)
clearly stated in their interview whether they intended to split or
steal in the final round, and they were equally likely to say that
they would split (N=68) or steal (N=80, Fisher’s exact test:
P=0.282). Females were less likely to express a clear intention to
either split or steal (66 of 131 females versus 82 of 121 males,
Fisher’s exact test: P=0.003), because, even though both sexes
were equally likely to say they would split (38 of 131 females versus
30 of 121 males, Fisher’s exact test: P=0.480), females were less
likely to say they would steal (28 of 131 females versus 52 of 121
males, Fisher’s exact test: P=0.0003). Seventy percent of the
contestants (104 of 148) were true to their stated intentions, (the
statement is not seen by other contestants so there is no strategic
reason to lie), which is significantly greater than the proportion
expected by chance (Binomial sign test: 104 successes in 148 trials,
P,0.0001). The probability of playing as they had intended was
the same whether the contestants stated they would split or steal
(21 of 68 splitters subsequently chose steal versus 23 of 80 stealers
who subsequently chose split, Fisher’s exact test: P=0.857), and
whether they were female or male (22 of 66 females versus 22 of 82
males, Fisher’s exact test: P=0.470). Thus the ratio of splitters to
stealers would appear to be equal as estimated by either
contestants’ hypothetical preferences or actual choices, although
both types are equally likely to change their mind, with a
probability of approximately 0.3 (95% CI: 0.23–0.38).
Correlates of cooperation
The main statistical model is summarised in table 2 and all the
results below are detailed therein.
Contestant demographics. Older contestants were more
likely to split (GLM: Wald x
2=9.12, P=0.003), although
contestants were not responsive to the their opponent’s age
(GLM: Wald x
2=0.01, P=0.980). Overall, the sexes were equally
likely to split when paired with the opposite sex (out of 91 pairings,
females split 47 times and males 45 times) and appeared to prefer
splitting with females (all female pairings were more cooperative
than all male pairings). However, there was an interaction between
the sexes that depended upon the season, with females becoming
increasingly likely to split with females, and steal from males, in the
later seasons (Wald x
2=8.72, P=0.003, Figure 2). The distance
between the two contestants current home-towns had no
significant effect although there was a suggestion that male
contestants were less cooperative with geographically close
opponents (Wald x
2=3.77, P=0.052).
Structural variables. The mean 6 S.E.M and median
Stakes were £14,0946£1,121, and £5,460 respectively, ranging
from a minimum of £3 to a maximum of £93,250. The mean 6
S.E.M and median Maximum-stakes available were
£47,3426£1,676, and £40,000 respectively, ranging from a
minimum of £5,000 to a maximum of £168,100. Contestants
were sensitive to the size of the prize fund available, becoming
more likely to steal when the stakes were larger (GLM: Wald
x
2=5.98, P=0.014, Figure 3), but there was an interaction
between the stakes and the maximum-stakes possible, suggesting
that for a given prize fund, contestants are more likely to split if the
potential prize fund was larger (GLM: Wald x
2=6.86, P=0.009).
Deciders were no more or less likely to split, nor were the receivers
of their deciding vote (GLM: Wald x
2=0.01, P=0.922).
Behavioral variables. Contestants that either told a lie or
were honest in the penultimate round were no more or less likely
to split (GLM: Wald x
2=1.86, P=0.173). Overall, contestants
were also unaffected if their opponent had lied or not (GLM: Wald
x
2=0.07, P=0.798), but a re-run of the analysis with those that
only told a lie to deny having a killer-ball excluded (N=81),
showed that those that inflated the value of their cash balls (N=30)
received less cooperation than honest contestants (GLM: Wald
x
2=4.36, P=0.037).
Contestants that ‘promised’ to split were more likely to do so
(GLM: Wald x
2=21.10, P,0.001), but their promises only had a
marginally non-significant effect upon increasing the likelihood
that their opponents split (GLM: Wald x
2=3.53, P=0.060).
Contestants that initiated laughter were more likely to split (GLM:
Wald x
2=9.92, P=0.002), but as with promises, such laughter
had no significant effect upon their opponents (GLM: Wald
x
2=1.25, P=0.264). There was a significant interaction between
contestants that initiated physical contact or were simply the
receivers of such physical contact, with contestants that neither
initiated physical contact nor were touched, being more likely to
split than anyone else (GLM: Wald x
2=5.77, P=0.016, see
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although perhaps only for Males (GLM: Wald x
2=4.33,
P=0.038).
Discussion
We used data from the television game show Golden balls as an
observational (non-experimental), high-stakes, prisoners’ dilemma
game. Contestants: (1) were sensitive to the size of the stakes, being
more likely to steal if the prize-fund was relatively larger (Figure 3);
(2) were more likely to steal if their opponent had inflated the value
of their cash balls; (3) were more likely to split if they had initiated
laughter, and more likely to steal if they had either touched their
opponent or been touched by their opponent. The sexes were
equally likely to split when playing against each other, but females
appear to be shifting towards preferring to split with females and to
steal with males (Figure 2).
Why do the stakes matter?
Contestants were sensitive to the size of the stakes, and appeared
to judge the value of the stakes in both absolute terms, and as a
proportion of the maximal prize fund that was possible. This
suggests that people use relative size heurestics to determine the
true worth of money, an effect reviewed and termed ‘‘anchoring’’
by Ariely [34]. This result may have implications for the external
validity of economic experiments played for typically small stakes,
although of course it could be argued that our televised setting is
just as problematic for external validity. Currently there is mixed
evidence on the impact of raising the stakes for economic games,
with many studies showing no effect, especially in the ultimatum
Table 2. Binary logistic generalized linear model on the probability of Split versus Steal (N=286, with errors clustered to 143
episodes).
Model Effect (Term) Wald x
2 P Beta Odds ratio Wald x
2 P Beta Odds ratio
Contestant
demographics
Final model Excluded from final model
Age (log)
1 9.12 0.003 21.51 0.220
Opponent-Age (log) / / / / 0.01 0.980 20.01 0.988
Sex 3.90 0.048 27.09 0.293
Opponent-sex 0.50 0.478 21.50 0.713
Distance (log) 1.40 0.237 20.67 0.513
Series 2.10 0.148 0.14 1.147
Sex*Distance
2 3.77 0.052 0.85 /
Sex*Opponent_sex 6.97 0.008 4.06 /
Sex*Series 0.68 0.411 0.74 /
Opponent_sex*Series 1.81 0.178 0.57 /
Sex*Oppo_sex*Series
3 8.72 0.003 22.09 /
Structural variables
Stakes (log) 5.98 0.014 22.66 1.208
Max-stakes (log) 8.72 0.003 22.78 0.567
Stakes*Max-stakes
4 6.86 0.009 0.27 /
Decider / / / / 0.01 0.922 20.03 0.968
Behavioural variables
Lie / / / / 1.86 0.173 20.42 0.656
Opponent-lie / / / / 0.07 0.798 20.08 0.927
Promise
5 21.10 0.001 1.41 4.095
Opponent-promise 3.53 0.060 0.58 1.780
Laugh
6 9.92 0.002 1.09 2.975
Opponent-laugh / / / / 1.25 0.264 0.41 1.510
Touch 1.05 0.305 20.30 0.743
Opponent-touch 0.10 0.749 0.75 2.114
Touch*Oppo-touch
7 5.77 0.016 21.28 /
Sex*Touch
8 4.33 0.038 1.20 /
1Older contestants were more likely to SPLIT.
2Males were more likely to SPLIT with geographically distant opponents.
3Over time, females became both more likely to SPLIT with females and less likely to SPLIT with males, males showed no change over time.
4STEALING was more likely as stakes increased but SPLITTING was more likely as the loss in potential winnings was increased.
5Promising was a reliable cue of increased probability of SPLITTING.
6Initiating laughter was a reliable cue of increased probability of SPLITTING.
7Touching was a reliable cue of STEALING, and being touched induced STEALING.
8Touching may only be a reliable cue of STEALING for males.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033344.t002
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contestants responded to their opponent’s sex depended on their own sex and the series. Males (on the right) from different series behaved similarly
but females (on the left) from later series were more cooperative to females and less cooperative to males compared to females from earlier seasons.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033344.g002
Figure 3. Logistic regression plot of the probability of a contestant splitting depending upon the value of the prize fund (Stakes).
The probability of a contestant splitting decreased with larger stakes. The equation for the fitted response to the prize fund held the Maximal
possible prize fund constant at the mean value of £40,324. The data have been separated, to improve visualization, by a process of shifting slightly
from their true positions to slightly above 0 or slightly below 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033344.g003
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many equilibria), but an absence of proof is not proof, and it may
just be that a sufficiently large change in stakes is required [25,35–
38].
Contestant demographics and subject pools
We found that older contestants were more cooperative, and
that the sexes appeared to treat each other differently. This has
two implications for laboratory studies, whereby participants are
typically university students and thus typically under 30 years old,
and usually unaware of the identity and characteristics of their
‘opponents’. The first implication is that absolute levels of
experimental cooperation may be under-estimates, but this should
not be a problem as well designed studies aim to compare the
response of participants to different treatments, rather than the
absolute level of cooperation in particular treatments, and our data
has nothing to say with regards to how different participants
respond to different treatments [39]. The second implication is
that the results of experiments may differ when participants are
free to form opinions, perhaps stereotypical ones, about their
opponents.
Just as laboratory experiments are criticized for only analyzing
young students, this study can be criticized for studying a
potentially non-random sample of the population [21,22,40,41].
Although the contestants appeared to vary considerably on the
show, they were a mixture of self-selected and commercially
selected people. It would not be unreasonable to suggest that the
personality types that are prepared to apply for the show are
biased towards traits such as extroversion or sensation-seeking for
example. Is this a problem? Boone et al’s 1999 study examined the
impact of personality on behavior in the prisoners’ dilemma and
found that ‘‘personality matters’’, with ‘sensation-seekers’ and ‘self-
monitors’ and those with an ‘internal locus of control’ showing
more cooperation [42]. However, this result was driven by
differences in the repeated version of the game, and there were no
significant differences in the one-shot game, but one could also
argue that our data do not come from a one-shot game due to the
preceding rounds. Such an interaction was also shown for ‘self-
monitors’ by Danheiser and Graziano’s 1982 study [43].
Additionally, Rapoport’s 1988 study found no difference, in a
one-shot game, between ‘‘Professionals’’, ‘‘Students’’, and ‘‘Em-
ployees’’, but found that ‘‘Business people’’ were marginally less
cooperative, although of course professions are a crude proxy for
personality [26].
Therefore the effect of personality on a one-shot encounter
appears mixed at best, and a comparison between the overall
result of our study (50% cooperation) matches well with the overall
result of Rapoport’s 1988 study, which found that 53% of 138
participants cooperated in a one-shot weak prisoners’ dilemma
[26]. Furthermore, our result is consistent with that found in the
first round of play of many economic experiments, and the overall
mean of 47% calculated from 130 experiments reported in Sally’s
1995 [16] meta analysis of the prisoners’ dilemma and the 51%
reported by Ledyard’s 1995 survey [44]. Thus our subject pool
Figure 4. The proportion of splitting depending on whether a contestant initiated physical contact and/or whether their opponent
initiated contact during the final two stages of the show. Contestants that were not involved in any physical contact were more likely to split
than contestants that either initiated contact or were merely the receivers of such contact.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033344.g004
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‘WEIRD’ (Western Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Demo-
cratic) sample [40,41].
Honesty and honest signals of cooperation
Contestants could presumably increase their chances of making
the final round by lying about their private information, but if they
lied by inflating the value of their cash-balls they suffered from
reduced cooperation, perhaps as a result of anger or reduced trust
from their opponent. This may explain why only 82 of the 429
contestants in the penultimate round chose to lie about their cash
balls. In contrast, contestants that lied by denying having killer-
balls were not treated differently, perhaps because their lies were
seen as ‘understandable’, as the only viable course of action open
to a contestant with a ‘bad hand’.
The correlation between initiating laughter and cooperating is
consistent with the idea that laughter and smiling function as
honest signals of cooperation [45–50]. Such honest signals can be
explained if they are too costly for defectors (by the ‘handicap
principle’) [51–53] or if they are linked genetically by the same, or
tightly linked, gene(s) (the ‘green beard’ mechanism) [54,55].
However laughter is presumably very cheap, for both cooperators
and defectors, and there is no good reason to believe or expect that
laughter and cooperating are linked genetically [54]. Alternatively,
laughter may generally serve to signal a desire to enter into a
mutualistic arrangement or to signal appeasement [56], a situation
whereby the signaler and receiver both favour the same outcome
[57]. Such a signal would not be adaptive within a one-shot
prisoners’ dilemma, because the lack of repeated interactions
would remove the shared interest between interactants. It is
therefore difficult to discern if our contestants were able to read
such signals as suggested by results of other studies [58,59]; but the
significant role of non-verbal communication in ensuring trust and
cooperation has been shown elsewhere [50].
The same argument applies to the function and value of
promises. Even though non-binding promises in a one-shot
interaction should be worthless we found that those contestants
that explicitly stated or promised that they would split were more
likely to split [13]. A similar result was reported in a Dutch sample
of a similar show [18] and pre-play communication was shown to
increase cooperation in the 1995 meta analysis by Sally [16].
However, once again we found that this potential signal of
cooperation had no significant effect upon contestant’s opponents.
Which may explain why stealers did not merely lie and pretend
that they were going to split.
Physical contact has been suggested to facilitate bonding
through the release of endorphins [60], but it had an adverse
effect in our data (see Figure 4), perhaps because whilst laughter is
perhaps somewhat difficult to fake convincingly, reaching out and
touching somebody is perhaps less so. In fact our contestants
seemed to believe too much in the power of touch, and stealers
were arguably prone to reach out in an attempt at manipulation,
an attempt that perhaps merely served to signal insincerity.
How do the results of our study compare with those of van den
Assem et. al. [31]? Both studies found that cooperation decreased
as the stakes increased and that there was an ‘‘anchoring’’ effect of
the maximal possible prize-fund, although van den Assem et. al.
suggest that this effect no longer occurs in later series (series we do
not have the data for). In addition, both studies found that
‘‘promises’’ were a reliable cue of cooperation but that they had no
detectable effect on opponents. Both studies also found lying to be
non-significant although we found that it depended on the type of
lie, and we also found the above-described effects of laughter and
physical contact. In contrast, van den Assem et al. found that
contestants were less likely to cooperate with those that had tried
to vote them off earlier in the show, whereas we analysed the
voting behavior in a different way. In the penultimate round, with
two contestants votes often cancelling each other out, we recorded
who had the deciding vote and found that these individuals were
no more or less likely to cooperate nor more or less likely receive
cooperation. As contestants cannot positively vote ‘for’ another,
but can only vote ‘against’ others, we suggest that this is why we
found no positive effect, whereas van den Assem et. al. recorded
votes against the focal player. They also recorded the voting
behavior from round one (which we excluded to reduce
complexity and uncertainty), and thus had a larger sample of
negative votes. It is unclear whether this increased statistical power
or a cognitive/behavioural bais in responding to negative votes
over positive votes is responsible for the difference in results
between the studies.
To split or steal: a repeated game or a one-shot game?
We described the final game in our show, and the unit of our
analysis, as a one-shot weak prisoners’ dilemma, but is it really a
one-shot game? Our result of 50% cooperation matches well with
the 53% cooperation found in Rapoport’s study on the one-shot
weak prisoners’ dilemma [26]. However perhaps our game should
be seen as the end round of a repeated, multi-faceted game? How
does our data compare to the final rounds in a finitely repeated
prisoners’ dilemma? Miller and Andreoni compared finitely
repeated games (played with one partner for 10 rounds) and
one-shot games (played one time with 10 sequential partners) and
found that cooperation was higher in the finitely repeated game, in
contrast to models based on rational backwards induction [15].
Although cooperation was higher, it declined rapidly towards the
final rounds of the finite game, i.e. as the reputational benefits
diminished. Cooper et. al. also compared a series of 10 one shot
games versus a round 10 games with the same partner and found a
similar result [61]. Both studies found that initial rates of
cooperation were higher in the repeated games, at around 50–
60% compared to 20–30%, but declined steeply in the final rounds
of the repeated game to around 20%. It is interesting to note that a
series of one-shot games with different partners appears to initiate
lower levels of cooperation than in the single one-shot games of
Rapport, suggesting a framing affect [26]. In comparison, our data
would appear to more resemble the opening rounds of a repeated
game rather than the final rounds, perhaps because our game is
part of the repeated game of life, and the large television audience
means that the wider reputational concerns do not diminish.
Of course if off-screen reputation concerns are so important
then this begs the question of why cooperation is not even higher?
One reason is that reputations can also be enhanced by punishing
and perhaps merely by not cooperating with cheats in certain
circumstances [62]. Or perhaps some participants are simply less
concerned about their off-screen reputation. Alternatively, they
may feel that the game-show setting justifies a more competitive
approach and that they can plausibly argue to their peers that their
in-game behavior is no guide to their real-world social behavior. It
would be interesting if laboratory experiments could explicitly test
the effect of framing experiments involving social dilemmas as
contests versus moral decisions. Intriguingly it has already been
shown that merely naming the prisoners’ dilemma as the Wall
Street game reduces cooperation to around 33% compared to
around 66% when named the Community game [63]. Of course
part of the commercial success of Golden balls is due to its
deliberate mixing and blurring of frames in order to invoke
competing behavioural norms (‘normative conflict’) [64] and thus
High-Stakes Televised Prisoners’ Dilemma
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e33344create more suspense for the audience and more discord for the
participants.
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